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Free-space continuous-variable quantum key distribution of unidimensional Gaussian
modulation using polarized coherent-states in urban environment
Shi-yang Shen, Ming-wei Dai, Xue-tao Zheng, Qi-yao Sun, Bing Zhu, Guang-Can Guo, and Zheng-Fu Han
Key Laboratory of Quantum Information, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China
We use single homodyne detector to accomplish Continuous-Variable quantum key distribu-
tion(CV QKD) in a laboratory and urban environment free-space channel. This is based on Gaussian
modulation with coherent-states in the polarization degree of freedom. We achieved a QKD distance
at 460m, at the repetition rate of 10 kHz. We give the security of this protocol against collective
attack in the asymptotic regime. The secure key rate is 0.152 kbps at the typical reconciliation
efficiency of 0.95. The experiment setup of this scheme is simplified and the difficulty to realize has
been remarkably reduced compared to traditional symmetric modulation ones, for example, GG02
protocol. The influence of security key rate brought by asymmetric modulation is small in a relative
low channel loss condition in the free-space environment. This scheme is expected to be significance
meaning to the future practically utilize.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution allows the two authorized
distant parties, Alice and Bob, to share a common key
via a potential eavesdropped quantum channel. The first
QKD protocol was been proposed in 1984 [1]. While CV
QKD protocols, especially ones with coherent-states light
source, has been concerned recently [2–4], which utilize
balanced homodyne detection technique, and light source
is not at single photon level. Therefore, it has advan-
tages of higher detection efficiency, thus higher secure key
rate, and anti photon number attack. During a few years
of development, CV QKD protocols and experiment im-
plementations have been modified and simplified. First,
the coherent-states protocols show substantial advantage
against squeezed-states versions[5–8] in the prepare of
light source, and theoretical secure distance improves re-
markably, which leads to the deep research of CV QKD
theory and realizing variable experiment schemes. As far
as the process of present experiments in the field of CV
QKD, the symmetrically Gaussian modulated coherent-
state(GMCS) protocols has been quite well studied[9–14]
since the composable security analysis has been revealed
[15]. Secondly, instead of Gaussian modulation, the dis-
crete modulation reduces the complexity in the classical
post-processing, in which case the signal-to-noise ratio is
low because of the long distance propagation loss. Fi-
nally, the unidimensional CV QKD protocol proposed
in 2015[18] further simplified apparatus in both prepar-
ing and detection sides since only one of the quadra-
tures should be Gaussian modulated instead of both be-
ing modulated simultaneously. Experiment scheme in
fiber channel has been accomplished in [36] and the secu-
rity key rate at finite size scenario has been proved[16].
Furthermore, composable security of unidimensional CV
QKD has been revealed in [17].
Besides, free-space channel is insensitivity to polariza-
tion compared to fiber channel, which results to be un-
changed of the light polarization as propagating. Thus
the polarization controller at receiver’s side can be left
out. In another words, the system needn’t calibrate po-
larization direction frequently, reducing the calibrating
time of non-key distribution, and thus increase the key
rate. On the other hand, encoding with polarization
avoids the non-synchronous disturbance of the phase.
Therefore, the phase locking between local oscillator and
signal is unnecessary as soon as the polarization has been
aligned to the same direction, significantly simplifying
the difficulty of system implementation. Security dis-
tance of CV QKD in free-space[8, 11, 12] channel can
reach dozens of kilometers, compatible with urban condi-
tion communication. It is expected to play an important
role in the future practical applications.
This experiment uses unidimensional CV QKD scheme
in the free-space channel, modulating the polarization
quantum Stokes parameter with Gaussian distribution
and gets the security key rate at real urban environment
condition of 460m, which turned out to be little less per-
formance but obviously simplified and more adaptable to
experimental environment, compared to GG02 protocol
at the same conditions.
The article is organized as follows, in section II and III,
we explain the principle of coherent-state encoded in po-
larization degree and give the security key rate analysis
against collective attack. In section IV, the experimen-
tal setup and environment will be revealed. Finally, in
section V, we deal with the raw key data and give the
security key rate.
II. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
In section II, we describe the prepare and measure ver-
sion of unidimensional protocol proposed in [18], which
correspond to the real experiment system implementa-
tion. In usual CV QKD protocols, both quadratures,
X and P, must be modulated simultaneously. However,
in this protocol, the situation is contrast. Only single
quadrature, without loss of generality, denoted as X, will
be modulated. Each coherent-state, is displaced by x in
phase space, which obeys Gaussian distribution centered
at 0 and has the variance of VM . And the other quadra-
2ture has the variance of 1,normalized at the shot noise
unit(SNU). Bob performs homodyne detective X quadra-
ture in a certain time interval and sometimes monitor
variance of P quadrature as a channel parameter. Af-
ter Alice and Bob share a sufficient long sequence of real
number raw key data, they estimate the channel param-
eters using a small random part of the data and perform
reverse-reconciliation [3].
For polarization encoding, quantum Stokes operators
are treated as quadratures like phase encoding scheme,
defined as follow [19]:
Sˆ0 = aˆ
†
H aˆH + aˆ
†
V aˆV ,
Sˆ1 = aˆ
†
H aˆH − aˆ†V aˆV ,
Sˆ2 = aˆ
†
H aˆV + aˆ
†
V aˆH ,
Sˆ3 = i(aˆ
†
V aˆH − aˆ†H aˆV ),
(1)
where subscripts H and V label the creation and annihila-
tion operators along horizontal and vertical polarization
mode, respectively. These creation and annihilation op-
erators obey the same commutation relations and Heisen-
berg uncertainty principle as the quadratures X and P in
phase space except a constant coefficient:
[aˆj , aˆ
†
k] = δjk, j, k = x, y (2)
and
[Sˆj , Sˆk = 2iǫlSˆjkl], forj, k, l = 1, 2, 3 (3)
While the variance of the latter three Stokes operators
satisfy
V ar[Sˆ2]V ar[Sˆ3] ≥ |〈Sˆ1〉|2 (4)
In our work, we use polarization degree to encode in-
formation. The S1 polarized (V mode) coherent-state
light plays the role of local oscillator(LO). S3 and S2
polarized state generated by a electro-optical modula-
tion(EOM) are two orthogonal quadratures. Since the
intensity of the modulated light is far weaker (about 3
orders of magnitude lower) than the LO, the loss of LO
is negligible, and the intensity of circle polarized light
|S1| nearly remain unchanged. In other words, the right
hand of equation (4) is approximatively a constant. The
output light is at strong vertical polarized mode with a
superposition of a very weak circle mode. More explic-
itly, the shape of the polarization state in x-y space is
an ellipse with a eccentricity of nearly unity, and its long
and short axis are oriented to the direction of modulation
intensity.
If the applied voltage of EOM is U , the phase difference
between ordinary and extraordinary light is φ = πU/Vπ,
where Vπ is the half wave voltage of EOM. Assume that
the annihilation operator of input light is:
aˆin =
aLO√
2
[
0
1
]
(5)
After EOM, without loss of generality, except for a phase
factor, the output light is
aˆin =
aLO√
2
[
0
eiφ
]
(6)
The light then passes through a quarter wave plate whose
fast and slow axises is 45 deg to the axises of EOM, and
the Jones Matrix of QWP is
JQWP =
[
cos π4 − sin π4
sin π4 cos
π
4
] [
1 0
0 i
] [
cos π4 sin
π
4− sin π4 cos π4
]
(7)
Then the light is
aˆ = J · aˆout = aLO
2
[
1 + ieiφ
1− ieiφ
]
(8)
After a 50:50 PBS and a balanced homodyne detector,
the measured photon number difference is
nmeas = aˆ
†
H aˆH − aˆ†V aˆV = a2LO sin
πU
Vπ
(9)
When U ≪ Vπ,
n ≈ a2LO
πU
Vπ
(10)
Thus, if U obeys Gaussian distribution, U ∼ N(0,Σ2),
then n ∼ N(0, a4LO π
2Σ2
V 2
pi
). The relation between applied
voltage on EOM and modulation variance VM is
VM =
π2Σ2V 2LO
V 2πN0
(11)
according to Eq. 10, where VLO is the voltage of lo-
cal oscillator in Alice’s side measured by DAQ. However,
the quadrature’s variance is in SNU, the Stokes opera-
tor must be normalized as X and P. On one hand, the
expectation value
〈Sˆ3〉 = 〈aHaV |i(aˆ†V aˆH − aˆ†H aˆV )|aHaV 〉
= 2a2LO sinφ
= 2nmeas
(12)
On the other hand, note that the local oscillator is strong
enough so that 〈S1〉 ≈ a2LO, donated as S1. By defined
two new operators
Xˆ =
Sˆ2√
S1
Pˆ =
Sˆ3√
S1
(13)
Xˆ and Pˆ are evidently have the same form of commu-
tation relations and Heisenberg uncertainty principle as
usual defined quadrature X and P. To be distinguishable,
we still use new symbols X and P instead of S2 and S3
3below, unless either mentioned. Therefore, Xa and Xb
are proportional to average photon numbers, thus pro-
portional to the voltages measured by DAQs since the
photo-diodes work on linear mode.
Xa =
2nprep√
na
Xb =
2nmeas√
nb
(14)
where na = a
2
LO and nb = Tηna are the average photon
number of local oscillator of Alice and Bob respectively,
and they can be monitored by power meter or wave os-
cilloscope in the unit as light intensity or voltage. And
T, η are overall transmittance and detection efficiency of
homodyne.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The security of CV QKD has been studied especially
in recent years. [22] give the extremality of Gaussian
states, and as a consequence, the extremality of Gaussian
attacks in [23, 24] against collective attack scheme in the
asymptotic region. In 2010[26], the finite-size effect anal-
ysis of CV QKD has been shown also by Leverrier. The
security against general attacks in practical finite-size re-
gion has been proven in 2013 [27], which exploits sym-
metry in phase-space even with post-selection, as far as
the modulation and post-election is symmetric in phase-
space. Soon later, Leverrier[15] achieved the composable
security for coherent CV QKD protocols against collec-
tive attacks, which established the security of coherent
protocols against general attacks.
The security key rate for the unidimensional protocol is
computed in [16, 18] against collective attacks in asymp-
totic and finite size region. As already obviously known,
the lower bound key rate is given by
K = IAB − χBE (15)
where
χBE = S(E)− S(E|xB) (16)
is the Holevo information [18, 28] between Bob and
Eavesdropper in the scheme of reverse reconciliation.
Since the eavesdropper holds the purification of the state
ρABE , the Von Neumann entropy can be expressed as
S(E) = S(AB),
S(E|xB) = S(A|xB) (17)
which can be respectively calculated through the covari-
ance matrix ΓAB, and on the other hand, the conditioned
Von Neumann entropy SA|xB through the conditioned en-
tropy ΓA|xB . More explicitly,
χBE = G
(
λ1 − 1
2
)
+G
(
λ2 − 1
2
)
−G
(
λc − 1
2
)
(18)
where the function g(x) is defined as
G(x) = (x+ 1) log(x+ 1)− x log x (19)
and λ1,2 are symplectic eigenvalues of ΓAB and λc is sym-
plectic eigenvalue of ΓA|xB .
In the description of entanglement-based scheme, the
covariance matrix of a two-mode squeezed vacuum state
is
γ =
[
V I2
√
V 2 − 1σz√
V 2 − 1σz V I2
]
(20)
The variance V is equal to
√
VM + 1 in prepare-and-
measure scheme with the modulation variance of VM .
According to [18], the covariance for unidimensional pro-
tocol is built by a squeeze operation on one of its mode,
for example, here S1, with a squeezing parameter of
r = − log√V , then the covariance matrix reads:
γAB =SγS
T
=


√
VM + 1 0 VM
√
VM + 1 0
0
√
VM + 1 0 − VM√VM+1
VM
√
VM + 1 0 VM + 1 0
0 − VM√
VM+1
0 1


(21)
where the squeezing operator S is
S =
[
(VM + 1)
1/4 0
0 (VM + 1)
−1/4
]
(22)
Now assume that the channel transmittance and noise
in X(or equivalently, S1) is ηx, ǫx, respectively. After
transmission through the noisy channel, the covariance
becomes
γ
′
AB1 =


√
VM + 1 0
√
ηxVM (VM + 1)
1
4 0
0
√
VM + 1 0 Cp√
ηxVM (VM + 1)
1
4 0 1 + ηx(VM + ǫx) 0
0 Cp 0 VP1


(23)
Since the P (or S2) quadrature is unmodulated, its vari-
ance Vp and the correlation between X (or S1) and P (or
S2), Cp, remains unknown to all communication parties,
including eavesdropper. Vp is monitored at Bob’s side.
Considering the realized model of balanced homodyne
detectors(BHD), it has a non-unity detection efficient ηe,
and electronic noise Ve in shot-noise unit. It is modeled
as an ideal BHD, followed by a PBS of a transmittance ef-
ficient ηe. A thermal state of a noise variance of 1+
Ve
1−ηe
injects from one of the port of PBS. In this case, the
covariance of Alice and Bob is [36]
γ
′
AB =


√
VM + 1 0
√
ηeηxVM (VM + 1)
1
4 0
0
√
VM + 1 0
√
ηeCp√
ηeηxVM (VM + 1)
1
4 0 1 + ηeηx(VM + ǫx) + Ve 0
0
√
ηeCp 0 ηeVP1 + (1− ηe) + Ve


(24)
4FIG. 1. Free-space CV QKD experiment setup for unidimen-
sional protocol.
Since the unknown parameters Cp and Vp must be phys-
ical, the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle gives their
bound
γAB + iΩ ≥ 0 (25)
where
Ω =


0 1 0 0
−1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 −1 0

 (26)
In the assumption of reverse reconciliation [3], Alice
guesses the measurement of Bob’s, so she holds the con-
ditioned covariance matrix:
γA|xB =
[√
VM+1(1+ηxǫx)
1+ηx(VM+ǫx)
0
0
√
VM + 1
]
(27)
IV. EXPERIMENT SETUP
The experiment setup for the unidimensional CV QKD
system in free-space is shown in 1.
The laser(type) centered at 786nm, about 1 nm of
full width at half maximum, is fiber pig-tailed and cou-
pled to free-space in Gaussian mode. The output inten-
sity is 15mW, and passes through two combinations of
a PBS(Thorlabs PBS252, extinction ratio≥ 33dB) and
a half-wave plate whose axis is nearly perpendicular to
the PBS axis. Since the axises of these two PBSs are
aligned at the same direction, and the half-wave plate
between them rotates the polarization of light nearly 90
degree, the output light intensity attenuates to 100µW
level, equally the magnitude of orders about 1 × 1014
photons per second. The quater-wave plate rotates the
linear polarization light to a certain elliptic polarization,
so as it becomes a circle polarization mode after the EOM
since the ordinary and extraordinary axises are probably
not at the same direction as PBS. Then, the polarization
state is modulated in the EOM(Thorlabs, EO-AM C1,
wavelength 600-900nm), whose modulation bandwidth
is 100 MHz [32]. Since the intensity of signal light is
far weaker than local oscillator light (3 magnitude of or-
ders), the voltage is controlled by computer, with Gaus-
sian distributed random intensity whose variance is Σ2 as
mentioned in Section II, which is about 165 times to the
shot-noise, at the modulation frequency of 10kHz, which
is limited by the acquisition bandwidth of DAQ mod-
ule(NI PCIe-6363, maximum acquisition rate is 2MHz).
The width of modulation signal pulses is 10µs, which is
much longer than the time difference of light distance
between the two arms of BHD (about10−11s).
The output signal with the local oscillator beam in
spatial mode is focus within 2.1mm of 1/e2 diameter,
and the full divergence angle of 4.5×10−4, enter a Galileo
beam expander(Thorlabs, GBE10-B, expansion is 10x) so
that the transmitted full divergence is 4.5× 10−5. After
propagated through a 460m free-space channel, the beam
diameter at the receive aperture is about 4 cm.
At the receiver side, a 4-inch reflection mirror is to ad-
just beam direction. Two convex lenses whose diameter
and focus are 4 inches, 20cm and 2 inches, 6cm reduce
the beam diameter to about 1cm. HWP3 is used to cal-
ibrate the polarization direction such that the receiving
local oscillator is polarized along vertical mode. QWP2
changes linear polarized light to circle so that the photon
numbers of two ports of PBS corresponds to left and right
circle polarized modes, respectively. Then, another EOM
placed between QWP2 and PBS, acts as a basis switcher,
to monitor the variance of S2 quadrature. It is modulated
randomly with the voltage of 0 or Vπ . When applied volt-
age is 0, the measured phonon number is X quadrature,
and when Vπ , P quadrature. Two congruent convex lens
focus the beam into photon diodes (Hamamatsu, S3883,
photon-sensitivity 0.58A/W at 780nm, equal to detec-
tive efficient 0.872 for each individual diode [33]). An-
other DAQ module is used to acquisit the output of the
difference voltage of two diodes for every pulse, at the
sampling rate of 1 MHz. Thus, for each pulse it takes
100 samples, of which 10 for each signal pulse since the
duty cycle is set to be 0.1. The average voltage of these
10 sample is raw key value for Bob. A consecutive 5 large
pulse (10V) marks the start of each communication, in
other words, the pulses followed the start pulses are as
the distributed keys.
V. EXPERIMENT RESULT
First we record the beam spot behaviors caused by
wandering and vibrating of the buildings. At receiver’s
side, a CCD camera beam profiler(Thorlabs, BC106N-
VIS/M) at the lens focus records the profile and jitter of
beam, as shown in Fig. V. The sensitivity area of photo-
5FIG. 2. Beam profiles recorded by CCD camera after two
output ports of PBS at Bob’s side at lens focus. Left: verti-
cal polarized. Right: horizontal polarized. For convenience,
the two beam profiles are seen in one figure. The horizontal
and vertical axises are position of beam, in unit of µm. The
diameter of two beams are not exactly the same because the
CCD deviates from lens focus at the two directions. The pro-
files are Gaussian in both x and y direction but shaped as
ellipse since beam is not vertical to lens.
diodes is about 1.5mm, much larger than beam diameter
so can collective all light intensity. However, the intensi-
ties are still fluctuate due to atmospheric turbulence.
The sender’s side is placed at 9th floor of a building
while receiver’s side is at 16th floor of another building.
Since the height of both buildings is high, their vibra-
tion is not negligible. The jitter of beam spot and trace
of spot center are shown in Fig. V and Fig. V, respec-
tively. The jitter in vertical direction is mainly caused
by beam wandering while the buildings vibration in hor-
izontal direction. The frequency of building vibration
is much lower than beam wandering due to atmospheric
turbulence.
Although beam spot always varies, it is at order of
magnitude of 100 1000µm, and the beam diameter fo-
cused by lens is about 200µm according to Fig.V and
Fig.V, therefore the whole intensity cannot always im-
pinges on the sensitivity area of photo-diodes, which is
of 1.5mm diameter. However, since the homodyne detec-
tor subtract two intensities of transmission and reflection
output of PBS, the jitter of differential intensity is sup-
pressed.
Before modulate the signal, the shot-noise and elec-
FIG. 3. The center of x and y as a function of time of beam
at the transmission port of PBS. Measure time is 10 minutes.
Red: peak position in y direction. Yellow: peak position in
x direction. Blue: position of intensity center in y direction.
Green: position of intensity center in x direction. The max-
imum jitter in vertical direction is about 100 µm(blue line),
while 1000 µm(green line) in x direction.
FIG. 4. Positions of beam spot center, unit in µm. Jitter in
horizontal direction is larger than vertical since the amplitude
of building vibration is much larger than beam wandering.
tro noise must be measured by a DAQ. The intensity of
lase output from EOM is 100µW , while 65µW input to
photo-diodes. When the laser is turned off, the variance
of measured data is electro noise VeN0, in the unit of V
2.
Then turn on the light, when the detection is balanced,
the variance is N0(1+Ve). Subtracting two variance gets
the shot noise N0 = 15.4mV
2, and thus Ve = 0.0219.
Then 5×105 Gaussian distributed (pseudo) random vari-
able, centered at 0, of variance of 1V 2, are generated by
computer software, and pulsed by the output of DAQ.
Modulation variance VM = 165 when Σ = 1V . However,
6FIG. 5. Key rate at different channel transmittance. Solid
line: GG02; dashed line: unidimensional protocol. Main pa-
rameters: VM = 165, ǫ = 0.0375, VP1 = 1.0, Ve = 0.0219, η =
0.872
smaller VM would be comparable to the leaked light from
the local oscillator since the isolation ratio of a single PBS
is only about 33 dB. The total transmittance measured
with power meter is 0.65, including optical components
reflecting loss and channel loss. A random chosen part
about 1/5 of data is used to estimate channel parameters
T and ǫ based on the equations:
T˜ = (
Cov(x, y)
VM
)2
ǫ˜ =
V ar(y)− Ve − 1
ηT˜
− VM
(28)
where x, y are the chosen string of data of Alice and
Bob’s. The excess noise ǫ˜ = 0.0375 and T˜ = 0.575, and
the latter is lower than that measured by power meter
since the sensitivity area diameter of power meter is much
larger than photo-diodes.
Another random 1/5 part of data is used to monitor the
variance of P quadrature, controlled by EOM2. When
the applied voltage is Vπ = 284V , the EOM2 acts as
a half wave plate and rotate the polarization direction
by 45 deg to measure ±45 deg modes. The accuracy of
applied voltage is 0.1 V, 3.52×10−4 of Vπ , precise enough
to suppress the modulated signal. Therefore, VP1 of Eq.
23 is 1.00.
With all parameters achieved above, the security key
rate can be evaluated. At distance of 460m atmospheric
environment, secret key rate is 0.0254 bit per pulse at a
typical reconciliation efficiency of 0.95, corresponding to
0.152 kbps, while secret key rate is 0.23 bit per pulse in
laboratory environment at the same modulation voltage,
electro noise but lower local oscillator intensity(30µW ).
The expected secret key rate of unidimensional versus
GG02 protocols at different total loss with experiment
measured parameter VM , ǫ, VeandVP1 is shown in Fig.
V. At low channel loss, unidimensional performs close
to GG02 protocol, but when transmittance is less than
about 0.6, it is a magnitude of order lower than GG02.
In our experiment, the main factors to restrict secret
key rate are the sample rate of DAQs, and the polariza-
tion fluctuation of laser. As mentioned above, sample
rate of DAQs is up to 1 MHz, and modulation frequency
is even lower, far less than the response bandwidth of
EOM, 100 MHz. Besides, the memory and CPU of com-
puter at Bob’s side are not able to process too many
key data (over 107), the key rate considering finite-size
region is expected to be further lower than the asymp-
totic limit[16]. At last, the fiber pig-tailed laser coupled
to free-space, may cause the polarization direction chang-
ing in the fiber and be unstable, lead to polarization noise
and thus intensity fluctuation of 0.1%. The further im-
provement will be made to extend the secure distance.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
To conclude, we accomplished free-space unidimen-
sional CV QKD experiment in a real urban environment
through the atmospheric channel of 460m. In such a
condition, the variance of the unmodulated quadrature,
S2 barely remains unchanged. With the correlation of
two quadrature unknown, the pessimistic raw key rate
against collective attacks reaches 0.0254 bit per pulse, at
the modulation repetition of 10 kHz.
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